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INTENSIFYING FRAGMENTATION? STATES, PLACES, AND DISSONANT 
STRUGGLES OVER THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 
 
Gordon MacLeod 
Department of Geography 
Durham University, UK 
 
Abstract 
This paper offers a detailed reading of The Fragmented State, authored by Ronan Paddison and 
published in 1983. This is arguably Paddison’s most significant book-length contribution, elaborating and 
giving shape to many of the concerns that have now become staples of this journal. Carefully working 
through the chapters of this book, the paper seeks to encapsulate its key moves and insights, while also 
demonstrating ways in which some key claims prosecuted by Paddison continue to hold a relevance for 
understanding ‘real world’ transitions in the institutional and territorial forms assumed by Western states 
since 1983. Attention is paid to how Paddison deconstructs the dynamics of different national state 
systems, emphasising varying relations and contestations between central, regional and local 
administrations. Because the latter have become synonymous with large metropolitan conurbations, the 
urban dimensions of state ‘fragmentation’ become highly significant, and it is revealed how Paddison 
anticipates multiple processes and politics central to the contemporary ‘splintering’ of urban-political 
governance in the early stages of the twenty-first century. The Fragmented State is not merely an 
impressive outcrop of past intellectual labour on space and polity, it remains a fresh provocation for all 
who take seriously the present challenges of state (re)formation. 
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1. Introduction: Ronan Paddison, political geography and The Fragmented State 
 
The untimely death of Ronan Paddison in July 2019 marked an extremely sad moment for those 
of us who were privileged enough to have benefitted from his warm encouragement, inspiration, 
and wise counsel in his role as editor of both Urban Studies and Space and Polity. I must 
confess, too, that for me this deep sorrow was compounded by shock. For it had seemed only 
a short time beforehand that Ronan, along with his two guest editors, Mark Boyle and Peter 
Shirlow, collaborating on what was to become the special issue of Space and Polity on ‘Brexit 
Geographies’, had provided some characteristically illuminating comments on a draft paper 
submission that was being developed by myself and my colleague and friend Martin Jones1. 
While this special issue was tragically to prove one of Ronan’s final scholarly contributions as 
an author (Boyle et al, 2018), it is also worth acknowledging how certain themes at the core of 
what ought to comprise any temperate discussion of Brexit – not least debate over the status of 
erstwhile constitutional arrangements, alongside probing questions over precisely where 
legitimate political authority and democratic representation ought best to reside – featured so 
prominently in his influential monograph, The Fragmented State: The Political Geography of 
Power. It therefore came as an honour to be invited by Chris and Mark to discuss this book as 
part of the proceedings to the ‘Ronan Paddison: A Commemoration of his Academic Life’ event 
held in the Geography Department at Glasgow University on 22nd November 2019. What follows 
provides an enlarged version of what I presented at that event, underlining the extent to which 
I regard it as a genuinely landmark contribution to the thinking of ‘space and polity’. Further, 
given the quite particular context in which this paper is written, I will refer to ‘Ronan’ throughout, 
rather than more normal academic convention of ‘Paddison’, but in doing so I intend my remarks 
as a serious statement about this scholar’s fundamental contributions. 
 
The Fragmented State (see Figure 1) was published in June 1983: in the midst of what was to 
become a conspicuously turbulent period in the political economic history of Britain. While 
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obviously going to press well in advance of the momentous landslide re-election of Mrs 
Thatcher’s government on 9th June 1983, the reader is appositely forewarned of such a 
likelihood. For a section of Chapter 3 – entitled ‘Territorial Integration and ‘Disintegration’ in the 
Unitary State’ – offers a most prescient analysis of how, in the election four years earlier, support 
for the Conservative Party across all social classes was becoming ever-more concentrated in 
the southern English shires and especially the South East region, just as an anti-Conservative 
vote was firmly taking root across much of Wales, Scotland, the rapidly deindustrializing regions 
of England, and urban Britain more generally (Paddison, 1983, pp.71-76). The territorial 
implications of this transforming electoral geography – not least in terms of how the Thatcher 
administrations of 1983 and 1987 were cynically to manipulate a spatially divisive two-nations 
political strategy that nurtured a particular socioeconomic base while simultaneously targeting 
‘enemies within’ (trade unions, metropolitan government, the public sector, even those working 
in older industries) – were to have profound consequences for the uneven development of the 
country’s economic geography, an associated mapping of inequality, the capacity of local 
government to respond to such challenges, and indeed the territorial integrity of the United 
Kingdom itself (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; Jessop et al, 1988; Lewis and Townsend, 1989; 
Paddison, 1993). The seven chapters that comprise The Fragmented State provide invaluable 
insights through which to interpret and re-interpret this restructuring. 
 
The publication of The Fragmented State (hereafter TFS) also coincided with a relatively 
flourishing context in academic Geography. This much is revealed in the ‘Introduction’ where 
Ronan acknowledges notable advances made by political geography “since the dark days of 
Geopolitik”, even alluding to “something of a mini-renaissance” (Paddison, 1983, p.vii, p.viii), as 
a multiplicity of perspectives began to enrich the subfield in conceptual and methodological 
terms. These included Marxist and Weberian analyses of the state alongside the World  
 
 
Figure 1: Front cover of The Fragmented State (Paddison, 1983). 
 
Systems Theory pioneered by Immanuel Wallerstein, all of which had been influential in the 
formation a year earlier of a new journal entitled Political Geography Quarterly2 under the 
editorship of Peter J Taylor (Taylor, 1984). Interestingly, in light of these fresh debates, Ronan 
uses the ‘Introduction’ of TFS to advocate quite unequivocally that the ‘common core’ of political 
geography ought to comprise the study of the state. Indeed, he interprets the state to be “the 
fulcrum of political life” (Paddison, 1983, p.viii) while insisting that to analyse its form and 
functioning, in turn, enables researchers to examine critical questions around conflict, 
consensus and power. His rationale for this focus is deepened in the early stages of Chapter 1, 
entitled ‘Politics, Space, and the State’, where he contends that: 
 
One of the more striking accompaniments of the emergence of the modern industrial state has been 
the marked increase in the volume and scope of government activity. ... [Indeed,] the state [has 
become] responsible for the supply of a growing array of services some of which, such as the defence 
of the national territory, it is argued, are more efficiently provided by the public rather than the private 
sector. Besides acting as a supplier of public goods, the state acts as a regulator – providing and 
maintaining the framework within which the market economic system can operate – and as the forum 
within which competing claims of different interest groups can be resolved (Clark and Dear, 1981). In 
most of the advanced industrial nations, the state has adopted a role as social engineer, aiming to 
structure society within a desired set of normative goals. This has led the state towards intervention 
in the socio-economic structure to meet some determined level of distributive justice, a role it has 
seen as necessary to counterbalance the inequalities created by the market system (Paddison, 1983, 
pp.1-2: added emphases).  
 
It was the geographical patterning of these very processes that constituted the intellectual 
filament of TFS3: the ‘fragmentation’ in question – while certainly evoking the potential for 
societies to experience political and administrative disarray – being much more a theoretical 
inducement to interpret the state as comprising a diffusion of power between central, most often 
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nationally-articulated, levels of administration and those located at sub-national levels, notably 
local, urban, and regional governments. For Ronan, it is only through a deep-seated 
appreciation and conceptual unpacking of the relationships between those central and sub-
central institutions – part of what might be termed the ‘territorial structure of the state’ (Cox, 
1993) – that meaningful insights are provided into how and where, for example, any potential 
‘growing array’ of publicly organized services – including health care, schooling, libraries, buses, 
and perhaps municipal housing – might appropriately be administered and delivered to citizens 
as part of any purported political endeavour to enhance distributive justice.4 Crucially, though, 
it was also about: 1) how political institutions located at different spatial levels of the state 
engage in a compromise over competing claims, not least the “fiscal implications of service 
provision in the fragmented state” (Paddison, 1983, p.ix); and, 2) relating in large part to the 
very legitimacy of such arrangements, how the multiply scaled political institutions themselves 
might be held to some democratic account by citizens5.  
 
2.  Territorial and institutional forms of The Fragmented State 
 
All of which raises a number of key questions that percolate through the early pages of TFS. 
Perhaps the primary one concerns precisely how states might be arranged territorially? Which 
then invites discussion over the appropriate balance of power and responsibility between 
central, local and regional levels of governments. And what is the likelihood that such a balance 
of territorial arrangements might enable some degree of distributive justice for citizens (Pahl, 
1975)? Moreover, how could this differ between states across the world and why? And recalling 
the ‘community power’ debate that had proceeded to shape so much urban political analysis in 
the USA (Hunter, 1953; Dahl, 1961), who actually governs and at which level (Paddison, 1983: 
3-6); and, by extension, over and through which spaces (spatial units and maybe also specific 
spatial nodes from which governance might diffuse)? Deliberations like these raise the spectre 
of what the political sociologist Bob Jessop (1982) simultaneously was analysing as the 
‘institutional form of the state’: not least the capacity to locate precisely which actors and 
organizations gain access to and influence the crucial institutions of government and 
administration; and whether, in turn, the state itself, through the enactment of particular strategic 
projects, might be operating clandestinely to favour certain interest groups while disregarding 
others. To simplify, then, TFS pitches its tent on the ground where territorial and institutional 
forms of the state intersect, sometimes readily, other times contradictorily or even conflictually. 
TFS thus emerged at a time when such thorny issues had undoubtedly become highly politicized 
in the United Kingdom, perhaps nowhere more so than in the discourse and practice of local 
government. In analysing such matters, Ronan draws on, among others, the conceptual 
innovations of prevailing Marxian scholarship, including Claus Offe (1975) and Manuel Castells 
(1977), alongside Cockburn’s (1977) research on the local state in Lambeth, London, and 
Saunders’s (1979) theorizations on urban politics in England, all helping to disclose embryonic 
discontent with the early reign of Thatcherism; not least in how central government was aiming 
to shrink financial support to local governments while also interfering in the autonomy afforded 
to those local states in terms of how and indeed where within their jurisdictions they might plan 
to spend these finances (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988).  
 
These were also early moments in what was to become a thorny dialogue over how we might 
appropriately conceptualize such local autonomy: something which at certain times during the 
1980s veered towards an enormously fractious polemic about the theoretical status of locality 
(Paddison, 1983, p.20)6. Dovetailing this controversy was a dispute over the conceptual value 
of space as an independent variable in shaping territorial arrangements. Among those 
eschewing its theoretical status was the aforementioned urban sociologist, Peter Saunders. 
Saunders reasoned that in order to understand differences in, for example, the quality of schools 
between Brixton and Chelsea in London or in the level of health care between Protestant and 
Catholic areas of Belfast, it is vital that such place variations are understood in terms of the 
respective class, race and religious differences associated with inhabitants rather than as 
properties or attributes of the spaces themselves. That premise drew Saunders to conclude that 
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it is class, race and religion rather than space which “constitute the keys to theoretical analysis” 
(Saunders, 1980, p.iv). Nonetheless, and while blending his characteristic geniality with a 
conceptual lucidity that foreshadowed those subsequent often intractable debates (Massey et 
al, 1984; Gregory and Urry, 1985), in TFS Ronan sees matters otherwise: 
 
... territorially based political conflict becomes more salient where spatial divisions coincide with class 
or ethnic divisions. This is apparent at both regional and local levels when there are demands for 
autonomy by regional ethnic groups or conflict over resource allocation between local jurisdictions. In 
this sense, space is a contributory factor: quite apart from the fact that such processes are taking 
place in space, it is because these class or ethnic differences are identifiable with distinct areas that 
space becomes an integral part of the explanation (Paddison, 1983, p.22).  
 
Attuned to the respective constitutive properties of these social and spatial relationships, Ronan 
offers further clarity about how, rather than somehow interpreting localities or regions 
themselves endeavouring to attain added powers of administration or leveraging financial 
support from central state levels, a premise that would invite the spectre of spatial fetishism 
(Soja, 1989),  it is, of course politicians and other front-stage players who seek to represent 
these spatial units: for it is they who do the ‘acting’ and who operate as ‘agents’ on behalf of 
such territories (Paddison, 1983, p.22; also Cox and Mair, 1988; Cox, 1993). 
 
Such a principle, which avoids any simplistic attribution of spatial units with ‘agency’ such as 
that which characterised Ratzelian political geography, becomes indispensable for Ronan when 
analysing different territorial expressions of the state, most notably between unitary (highly-
centrally administered) and federal (locally-regionally devolved administrative) states as 
presented in Chapter 2, entitled ‘Territory and Power’. In looking to place a dot along any given 
‘decentralization-centralization’ continuum, a unitary state could conceivably be organized along 
entirely centralized lines, especially in the case of city-states and very small countries. However, 
as Ronan underlines, in practical political administration as opposed to formal constitutional 
proclamation, it tends to be the case that ostensibly unitary states, including those in northern 
Europe such as Sweden, Ireland, and France, experience some degree of authority and 
responsibility being devolved to local administrations, albeit the latter functioning within a 
relative hierarchy of power directed from central institutions. Perhaps this is hardly surprising 
given how the origins of local multi-purpose representative government can be traced to 
medieval Europe (consider here the cases of Venice and Florence) while the nineteenth century 
also witnessed a wave of resurgence, not least in response to demands for services and 
participation from rapidly expanding urban populations (Paddison, 1983, pp.30-31).  
 
Federal states are formally constituted territorially as comprising at least two distinct layers of 
government. Classically, this features a central administration – often named the Federal 
government – sharing power and a qualified sovereignty with regional-level states as to be found 
in the cases of the USA, Australia, and Germany7, or provinces in Canada and cantons in 
Switzerland. Throughout Chapter 4, entitled ‘Federalism: Regional Diversity within National 
Union’, Ronan immerses the reader in an astonishingly impressive detailed analysis of how 
each of these political arrangements are contextualized in historical claims to local or regional 
autonomy, sometimes with the spectre of colonial relations. And yet, given how “federalism 
offers an institutional mode that balances the centrifugal and centripetal forces within the state” 
(Paddison, 1983, p.97), as a mode of territorial government it has significant capacity to avert 
prospective divisions between a political and economically dominant core and a dominated or 
colonized periphery. Indeed, Ronan identifies how in practice this ‘territorial pluralism’ was 
evident in the way that Canada’s federalism has served to enhance at least relatively the cultural 
and political distinctiveness of Quebec province; not least in the way that the Federal capital, 
Ottawa – located in the relatively powerful province of Ontario, which itself hosts Canada’s 
premier city of Toronto – transferred some key powers over health and welfare policy to Quebec, 
all crucially matched with supportive funding (Paddison, 1983, p.134). Ronan’s consideration of 
centripetal and centrifugal forces within the state could also be deployed to compare and 
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contrast how, since the 1980s, under a Federal regime Germany’s regional economic 
geography has remained moderately balanced, while under a centralized unitary regime the 
United Kingdom economy has become increasingly lop-sided by the hyper-dominance of 
London (Paddison, 1983, pp.136-37; Massey, 2007; Martin et al, 2016). In sum, although always 
wary of over-generalisations, Ronan suggests here that a measure of fragmentation – which 
absolutely need not imply incoherence or even some kind of anarchy with respect to politics, 
policy and planning – may actually be more successful, over time, in fostering a more equal and 
more justly distributed society and associated political economy. The implications for current 
deliberations about the ‘Brexit geographies’ of the United Kingdom are legion. 
 
Examples like these of course recall a question raised earlier about how key responsibilities 
might be divided among different levels of government. Traditionally, functions like defence and 
national security, foreign affairs, and macroeconomic policy have tended to be reserved for 
central government: indeed, this has tended to be the case in both unitary and federal states. 
Yet for other functions, there is considerable variation within and between these two territorial 
forms such that identifying distinct trends is far from straightforward (Leemans, 1970). Not least 
is this respect, the case arises of countries that are formally of unitary status but which 
experience a de facto variant of devolution, itself often asymmetric whereby powers are granted 
only to certain regions. Drawing on the ground-breaking work of Elazar (1975), Ronan refers to 
these as ‘compound unitary’ states, of which there are two types. One is associated with 
countries that permit relatively small communities to preserve their cultural identity while 
retaining political, economic, and military ties to a more powerful nation-state; an example being 
where Madeira and Azores were permitted relative autonomy in Portugal after the fall of 
Salazar’s dictatorship (Stevens, 1977; Paddison, 1983, pp.31-32). The other type of ‘compound 
unitary’ form relates to those which contain regional level territories – sometimes perhaps 
garnished with a national consciousness – which have been bestowed certain legislative powers 
or responsibilities that in conventional unitary states would ordinarily be deemed the prerogative 
of central government:  
 
Regional devolution of this type is often only granted to parts of the state and in particular, where it 
is more generally associated with multi-national states, to ethnically distinct minority homelands. 
Examples are found in both the developing world (Sudan, Burma) as well as the developed world 
(Italy, Spain). Insofar as regionally recognized units such as Sicily, Wales, or Scotland are as 
‘indestructible’ (Duchacek, 1970) as Queensland or Alberta, this ‘quasi-federal’ devolution does 
reflect qualities similar to federally organized countries (Paddison, 1983, p.31).   
 
Perhaps of particular note here is the case of Scotland, the country where Ronan spent his 
working life and in doing so contributing enormously to its educational and civic society. 
Scotland in the early 1980s could be interpreted perhaps most plausibly as a territory 
characterized by some delicate balance between ‘peripheral nationalism’ and ‘regional 
nationalism’. Maybe the discovery of North Sea Oil in 1970 had worked in the eyes of some to 
potentially ‘de-peripheralize’ its economic status vis-à-vis the economic geography of Britain 
following a period that is widely depicted as representing incremental industrial decline (Dickson 
et el, 1980; Devine, 2012). It was also to foster electoral support for the avowedly separatist 
Scottish National Party (SNP) throughout the 1970s, although without ever reaching a sizeable 
majority to challenge the London-based political order centred in Westminster (Paddison, 1983). 
However, the Thatcherite decade was to precipitate a more confrontational politics, as central 
government explicitly eschewed support for Scotland’s remaining industrial sectors, while 
simultaneously choosing the nation as a ‘test-bed’ for some deeply unpopular policies, most 
notoriously water privatization and the Poll Tax: all of which, as Ronan was to contend in a 
timely intervention a decade after TFS, revealed the “fragility of the relationship between 
Scotland and the British state” (Paddison, 1993, p.167). To be sure, Scotland was only one 
among many regions across the United Kingdom that had witnessed a decimation of its 
industrial base alongside a rise in mass unemployment and an ensuing erosion of the local and 
regional social fabric (Hudson, 1989; Lewis and Townsend, 1989), but the callous political 
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approach of Thatcherism was further viewed to be an erosion of Scotland’s administrative 
autonomy alongside a diminution of social welfare commitments discretely cultivated during the 
twentieth century (Paddison, 1993; Paterson, 1994).  
 
Nonetheless, those other United Kingdom regions lacked the intricate institutional fabric that 
Scotland had accrued since its 1707 Union with England (here just recalling the asymmetrical 
devolution characterising the ‘compound unitary’ state of the UK). And by the time that Mrs 
Thatcher had delivered the now infamous ‘Sermon on the Mount’ on 21st May 1988 – where, in 
addressing the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, she chose to hector her audience 
about the need to better appreciate the principles of the free market as advocated by her own 
favourite ‘Scot’, Adam Smith – notable institutions across Scotland’s society had begun to 
collectivise in outright opposition. At the heart of this was the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, 
which less than two months after Thatcher’s speech, published A Claim of Right for Scotland 
(Marr, 1995; Devine, 2012). When the 1992 General Election returned yet another Conservative 
government for which Scotland’s electorate had displayed little support, the Claim of Right 
became championed by a Scottish Constitutional Convention, whose mix of cross-party political 
backing alongside that from civic organizations including churches, trade unions, women’s 
groups, and some key business interests went some way to pave the way for the establishment 
of a Scottish Parliament (MacLeod, 1998a; 1998b). The Parliament itself in Holyrood, 
Edinburgh, was opened in 1999, only two years after New Labour had surged to power in the 
United Kingdom General Election of 1997.  
 
What followed can, perhaps in retrospect, be characterized as a decade of relative political 
harmony where Labour governments in Westminster operated with coalition governments in 
Holyrood. However, any purported consensus was shattered in 2010 with the election of the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat ‘Coalition’ government. And in the last decade a succession of 
Conservative-led administrations have waged a brutalizing strategy of protracted austerity, 
cutting welfare and drastically reducing support to local government (Meegan et al, 2014; 
O’Hara, 2014), before then subjecting the whole of the United Kingdom to Brexit: all at a time 
when Scotland – both at Westminster and Holyrood – has turned increasingly toward support 
for a resurgent SNP vehemently opposed to austerity and Brexit (Paddison and Rae, 2017; 
Boyle et al, 2018; O’Toole, 2018). Perhaps it was the potential for such a politically rancorous 
set of arrangements that Ronan had in mind when forewarning of how “devolution gives 
peripheral nationalism a lever by which separatism becomes possible” (Paddison, 1983, p.93). 
If the story here is indeed one of a fragmenting (British) state, then it is one that can undoubtedly 
be enriched by re-reading Ronan’s work in TFS and elsewhere. 
 
3.  Urbanising Political Geographies, Politicising Urban Geographies 
 
The final section turns the focus more directly towards Ronan’s expertise as a scholar working 
so productively between political and urban geographies, something also underlined in the 
opening paper by Philo (2020) alongside other contributions to this SI. In part this cross-
fertilisation in Ronan’s work is signalled in TFS where attention to local scales of government 
and governance necessarily leads him to examine how a burgeoning population, in the UK, the 
US and elsewhere, was increasingly congregating in expanding metropolitan areas with their 
own institutionally-formalised and territorially-designated spheres of administrative control. To 
discuss the political geographies of ‘the fragmented state’ is also thereby to take seriously such 
metropolitan administrations8, entailing an appreciation of the relations between central 
governments and city authorities, while also being attentive to the prospect of intervening 
‘regional’ levels of authority, particularly in federal states; something Ronan readily 
acknowledged given his keen interest in US urbanization (see Cox, 2010). Sometimes this can 
translate into a politics precisely about the administration of a city, perhaps inciting aspirations 
to reconfigure that very territorial shape of administration as in the case of newly formed 
communities in suburban districts aspiring to resist annexation by the ‘big city’ government and 
instead to incorporate as an independent city: a process that fosters new institutional-territorial 
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divisions within a given metropolitan area, in turn altering its electoral geography and the spatial 
composition of its tax base (see 3.2 below). In some senses such a shift replicates at an urban 
scale the unitary-fragmentary (centralization-decentralization) dynamics examined by TFS at 
the national scale. If the focus arising here might plausibly be termed an ‘urban political 
geography’ or perhaps better an ‘urbanizing of political geographies’, what also comes into view 
on occasion in TFS is a ‘politicizing of urban geographies’, which arises when different interests 
groups, communities, minorities and more become embroiled in often highly politicized – 
contested, disputed, dissonant, bellicose – struggles over the particular mix of services, 
provision, facilities, infrastructure, and forms of representations being ‘distributed’ across the 
spaces of the city. If such an orientation may be less prevalent in TFS, Ronan does have quite 
a lot to say about the politics of city-wide services such as education; but it might also be 
contended that these are the very processes which increasingly grabbed his attention and focus 
in later work on the politics of public spaces and communities and artworks, as clearly apparent 
from several other contributions to this SI. 
 
3.1 Servicing cities through the fragmented state 
 
Chapter 5 of TFS – ‘Local Services and the Fragmented State’ – turns attention towards a more 
explicit analysis of ‘lower’ levels of sub-state government such as local, county, and urban 
jurisdictions. Ronan is keen to underline the significance of local service provision for the 
political geographer. For he reasons that “[I]n a simple descriptive sense” (Paddison, 1983, 
p.145), it is important to examine patterns of territorial variation in the provision of amenities and 
what Kevin Cox (1979) termed ‘the spatial patterning of welfare’. The volume and range of 
services being delivered locally could conceivably vary depending upon the institutional and 
territorial form of the state, unitary or federal. It also varies in accordance with the demarcated 
sharing of functions between different levels of government: generally, local authorities do tend 
to be responsible for ones like the maintenance of law and order, fire, planning, property and 
environmental amenity, education and public enlightenment, culture and recreation, and certain 
welfare functions (Paddison, 1983, pp.147-49)9. Of course, in principle any variation in the level 
of service within a particular country might be deemed unjust. Yet in practice there may be quite 
compelling justification on the grounds of need and demand whereby two citizens located in 
neighbouring jurisdictions are in receipt of quite variable levels of goods and services. It is in 
this sense not least that, as Ronan underlines: 
 
Governments, and what they do, are instrumental in influencing life-chances; indeed their role is 
potentially crucial insofar as the public sector can become a useful vehicle to compensate for the 
inequalities created by dependence on the market-place economy (Paddison, 1983, p.146).  
 
As alluded to earlier, such moments of compensation depend upon political commitments which 
customarily involve different levels of the fragmented state compromising over the detail of what 
is to be delivered. Crucially, though, the very act of territorially dividing the state invariably 
demarcates sub-areas with divergent needs and preferences as well as quite varying fiscal 
potential vis-a-vis tax-raising capacities, the effect of which is that localities can come to endure:  
 
... a mismatch between fiscal resources and fiscal needs, the product of superimposing jurisdictional 
networks on the regional and local surfaces of economic inequality brought about by the spatial 
division of labour (Paddison, 1983, p.165).  
 
This ‘fiscal mismatch’ can potentially serve as a political lightening rod when the poorer 
jurisdictions with weaker fiscal capacity are also those in greater need of additional spending 
on services and infrastructure. Such scenarios typically precipitate the deployment of fiscal 
equalization programmes, largely via grants provided by the central state to local authorities. 
Ronan offers an instructive example of the Rate Support Grant (RSG) in Britain. At the time of 
writing TFS, a local property tax – rates – based on the rental (as opposed to the capital) value 
of a property accounted for the greater proportion of locally raised revenue, often reaching up 
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to 60 or 70 per cent. Nonetheless, given how the space economy of Britain was being radically 
restructured – leading many regions in the North and West to be confronting devastating 
industrial decline – the fiscal map of the country saw notable variations in rateable value 
between local authorities, not least as a consequence of the varied mixes of residential and 
non-residential land-uses and income groups between the jurisdictions (Paddison, 1983, p.166). 
The upshot of such uneven development was that by 1979-80, the RSG – offered as a ‘block 
grant’  and thereby not earmarked for specific programmes and in essence offering some local 
autonomy to authorities – was providing 61 per cent of total expenditure on a whole range of 
services from education to health to parks and recreation, but not including housing, transport 
and police which were met by ‘categorical grants’10. All of which reveals how Britain’s local areas 
were so heavily dependent upon fiscal transfers from centre. 
 
Nevertheless, any consensus that had come to prevail over these fiscal arrangements was 
severely dislocated in the early 1980s as the Conservative government replaced the RSG with 
an alternative which was designed with punitive intent to curtail the spending capabilities of local 
authorities. As Ronan signifies: 
 
Such changes have heightened centre-local conflict – local governments resent the alleged erosion 
of their autonomy, particularly the high-spending Labour-controlled authorities that, anyway, are 
opposed to the national government’s spending cuts policies. In Scotland this has already led to direct 
conflict between the centre and the Labour-controlled Lothian region, [leading to...] the eventual 
reduction of the local budget in line with the centre’s assessment (Paddison, 1983, pp.154-55).  
 
Ronan’s analysis here portends how the mid-1980s was to witness an acrimonious struggle 
waged between a central government very much now identified with Mrs Thatcher and a Greater 
London Council (GLC) led by the high profile left-wing Mayor, Ken Livingstone. Certain policies 
developed by the GLC such as a ‘restructuring for labour’, which was designed to preserve 
London’s manufacturing and a ‘fares fair’ commitment to ensure that public transport in the city 
be affordable to all, were certainly popular among many Londoners; but they diverged manifestly 
from the Thatcherite strategy to develop London as a financial centre and induce a privatisation 
of public services (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; Jessop et al, 1988; Cochrane, 1993). Central-
local discord intensified over the future direction of London before the hugely controversial 
decision was taken by Mrs Thatcher to abolish the GLC alongside the other metropolitan 
councils in England’s major cities (Paddison, 1986). From the perspective of the central state, 
it appeared to be the case that local government had shifted from being an indispensable agent 
entrusted to deliver services to local areas to an intensely mistrusted object of political regulation 
(Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; Goodwin et al, 1993). And with “considerable emphasis [now 
being] laid on the need to reduce public spending, by both central and local government” 
(Paddison, 1983, p.179), it revealed the fragility of local autonomy when confronting a central 
state adversary. Across the Atlantic, Mrs Thatcher’s ally, President Reagan, was taking similar 
aim at the Federal orchestrated intergovernmental aid to cities, with nine programs of special 
importance to urban governments being cut by 47 per cent between 1980 and 1987 just as 
federal assistance was shifting away from distressed urban areas to those with ‘opportunity’ 
(Judd and Swanstrom, 2006). Ronan encapsulated the moment judiciously in his claim that 
“how services are financed by local government, therefore [was becoming] intertwined with the 
larger fiscal crises of the state” (Paddison, 1983, p.147): the political geography of service 
provision had just become deeply politicized.  
 
In chapter 6 of TFS – ‘Cities, Services, and Political Fragmentation’ – Ronan begins with the 
two-pronged claim that with many countries seeing higher levels of urbanization,11 so “the 
government of cities has proved to be one of the more difficult, but also one of the more 
pressing, problems of the contemporary state” (Paddison, 1983, p.183). Not least in that an 
urbanized population sees citizens becoming more dependent upon one another and indeed 
more affected by the actions of each other if only as a consequence of the higher population 
densities. Ronan encourages the reader to consider two essential elements of urban politics: 
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“the importance of governmental intervention and the idea of the city functioning as a large 
resource system” (Paddison, 1983, p.183). This inevitably posed questions pertaining to the 
quantity and range of services any particular city authority might deliver – which, as we have 
seen, are customarily agreed in dialogue with other levels of the state – alongside the question 
of where exactly those said services might be distributed across the urban area. While local 
citizens might view it beneficial for certain services like schools, theatres, and shops to be close 
to their homes, others like a noisy pub, a drug treatment centre, or a new highway may not be 
so welcome. In analysing how these political geographies come to be decided, Ronan 
synthesises a most impressive menu of academic perspectives, including those at the heart of 
the afore-mentioned US community power debate (Hunter, 1953; Dahl, 1961), Harrigan’s (1976) 
work on functional fiefdoms, Williams’s (1971) early move on political ecology, and Castells’s 
(1977) departure from orthodox Marxism whereupon he views cities be increasingly the primary 
site where struggles are waged over ‘collective consumption’ rather than over production and 
work (Paddison, 1983, pp.186-87: see also Figure 2). 
 




Source: Paddison, 183, pp.186-87 
 
Later Ronan summons Pahl’s (1975) influential work revealing the non-trivial discretionary 
power of urban managers in England’s localities vis-à-vis elected councillors and officials (like 
planners and housing offers), as well as in relation to private sector actors like developers, 
insurance companies, and building societies. He also invokes Lipsky’s (1976) insights into 
‘street-level bureaucrats’ like teachers, social workers, police, and environmental enforcement 
officers who deal exclusively with the public in terms of service delivery and what we might term 
social regulation but who can often work with relative independence. In assessing these 
perspectives, Ronan perceptively contends that, just as such bureaucratic discretion might be 
shaped by progressive principles, it could also be slanted with prejudices towards certain 
classes and people of colour while also actively stigmatising neighbourhoods,12 thereby 
potentially expediting a range of discriminatory and unjust geographies in housing allocation 
and many services including education and policing (Paddison, 1983, pp.201-02; Rex and 
Moore, 1967; Gottdiener, 1987). Nevertheless, some communities draw on their collective 
energy and inspiration to question what they perceive as unjust practices of allocation and 
distribution. Ronan offers the fascinating example of the Green Ban movement13 in Australia 
during the 1970s, which involved an alliance of local resident groups and trade unions – 
something akin to Castells’s (1977) idea of a ‘new social movement’ – thwarting certain building 
projects deemed harmful to the community. This represented an ad hoc grass-roots form of 
activism by the ‘less powerful’ whose objective was less about influencing where a public facility 
might be located, so much as preventing commercial development within areas which the 
movement considered sensitive and in need of conservation. Ronan analyses a notable 
example of this early politicizing of urban ecology thus: 
 
Residential development had been granted for an area of Hunter’s Hill, a high status suburb of 
Sydney, known as Kelly’s Bush, which was one of the few remaining areas of natural bushland within 
the city. A local resident action group acted in concert with the Building Labour Federation to stop the 
development, the unions saying that if development was not halted they would impose a ban on all 
of the developer’s other projects within the city. Such pressure proved extremely effective in halting 
unwanted developments, though the results of the protests were arguably more distributive that they 
were redistributive (Paddison, 1983, pp.190-91; also Paddison 1978)14. 
 




Evidence of state fragmentation is perhaps most powerfully revealed in a brilliant section of TFS 
which examines ‘the impact of metropolitan fragmentation’ in the US. Here, Ronan noted how 
historically the trend across the US landscape inclined towards ever-increasing splintering, 
largely in parallel with the growth of the metropolitan population, such that the number of 
jurisdictions increases with the size of American Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(SMSA). By 1972 the US had 264 SMSAs and a total of 22,185 local governments: 42 per cent 
of these were multi-purpose jurisdictions – counties, municipalities, and towns – with the 
majority of the rest comprising single-purpose governments including school districts and so-
called special districts which were becoming increasingly prominent in delivering a range of 
services such as fire protection, utilities, sewerage, housing and urban renewal, school 
buildings, and parks and recreation. The prescience of Ronan’s contention about increasing 
fragmentation is only reinforced by statistics from 2012 revealing a US total of 392 SMSAs15 
and 89,004 local governments16. Notably this featured 37,203 special districts: a subdivision 
which Ronan had discerned to be inducing a ‘balkanization of the city’, while their proliferation 
in recent years has aroused significant concerns about how their increasingly stealth-like 
‘corporate’ approach to development can lead to ‘political circumvention’ often evading citizen 
participation and representative democracy (Kirkpatrick and Smith, 2011; MacLeod, 2011; Judd 
and Hinze, 2019)17. As signalled by Ronan, the way in which this plethora of agencies operates 
through a deployment of territories which overlay jurisdictions already occupied by multi-
purpose governments can foster ‘territorial confusion’ over boundaries; yet of equal importance 
was how these units have separate taxing powers (Paddison, 1983, p.202).    
 
Jurisdictional fragmentation is generally more pronounced in the older SMSAs of the North East 
(except New England) and the North Central regions than the newer cities of the South. And 
Ronan noted how in 1972 it was the Chicago metropolitan area that was identified to be the 
most governmentally fragmented, with 1,172 units of government. Nearly five decades on, and 
the Chicago SMSA remains at the peak of the ‘fragmentation index’18 with 1,550 units, followed 
by Pittsburgh, St. Louis, New York and Philadelphia (Hendrick and Shi, 2015). Of course such 
jurisdictional fragmentation itself obviously demands some explanation. Again Ronan offers 
terrific insight when revealing how, up until the end of the nineteenth century, the industrial cities 
of the North and East had actually been quite successful in expanding their territorial boundaries 
by annexing their growing populations who in turn welcomed a growing number of services 
provided by city government. But this trend was being somewhat arrested by the early-twentieth 
century, primarily as a consequence of how: 
 
... the emergence of the large, socially heterogeneous, machine-controlled urban governments, 
divided along class lines, in which the machine gained its greater support from lower-income groups, 
led to growing anti-urban feeling among the “middle-class on the periphery [who] concluded that the 
only way to save themselves from domination by the core was to separate their neighborhoods from 
the inner city” (Danielson, 1972: 149) (Paddison, 1983, p.203).   
 
The political-geographical tide of metropolitan development appeared to be turning, as across 
much of the US many suburban communities with burgeoning middle- and higher-income 
households began to question the logic of being governed by a seemingly distant municipal 
authority and equally to be paying higher taxes to service the needs of a big city with ‘big city 
problems’ (Peck, 2011). It was precisely these ‘anti-urban’ sensibilities that nurtured the 
motivation for many suburbs to incorporate as independent jurisdictions – which, as Ronan 
underlines, were often actively supported by State-level governments that themselves had 
become hostile to the larger cities – and which in turn precipitated the extraordinary political 
fragmentation that has since come to characterize the American metropolitan landscape 
(Paddison, 1983, pp.202-212; cf. Fishman, 1990; Dreier et al, 2001; Cox, 2010).  
 
In TFS Ronan is nevertheless deeply concerned too about the ensuing consequences of such 
governmental fragmentation and how it was reconfiguring fiscal capacity, local taxes, services, 
and questions of equity and spatial welfare19. He presents the so-called ‘exploitation thesis’20 
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developed by Hawley (1951), who contended that those living in central cities were paying for 
a range of services which were being used by suburban commuters who were not contributing 
to the cost. While Ronan casts doubt on the extent to which this situation might be conceived 
as entirely a one-way exploitative relationship – particularly given how commuting has the 
capacity to raise the central city tax base – he is in little doubt that the growing separation of the 
central city from the suburbs, and indeed of one suburb from another, has intensified fiscal 
mismatches, particularly in terms of how central city and low-income older suburbs can 
realistically meet their high service demands. Such trends leave many urban governments 
confronting a fiscal crisis – a fiscal crisis of the urban state, if we may (cf. Castells, 1977) – while 
thereby aggravating progressive endeavours to redistribute resources in support of low income, 
working class, and minority communities, including those introduced as part of Lyndon B 
Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ Programme (Phillips-Fein, 2017). Indeed, for Ronan: 
 
The political fragmentation of city and suburbia along class and ethnic lines is the primary means by 
which the system of urban stratification is maintained. Suburban incorporation ensures the protection 
of class interests: just as the patterning of residential areas into homogeneous class and ethnic zones 
is a means of maintaining ‘life-style values’, so suburban incorporation, particularly through the zoning 
power that local jurisdictions enjoy, is a means of cementing this socio-spatial arrangement. The tax-
base question is very important within this equation; a basic goal of each jurisdiction is the 
minimization of its tax rate, which leads to attempts to zone in and out uses that have positive and 
negative fiscal externalities respectively (Cox, 1978). However, the competition is inherently an 
unequal one, because of the tax and other advantages of the wealthier jurisdictions and their zoning 
behaviour, so that the stratification is perpetuated (Paddison, 1983, p.211).   
 
Again, though, Ronan offers extraordinary foresight in his claim that, just as the metropolis was 
expanding, differences between suburban jurisdictions were becoming equally as prevalent as 
those between suburbs and the central and inner city. In outlining how the suburbs per se “have 
become differentiated into rich and poor jurisdictions, and how the ability of middle- and upper-
income municipalities to zone out public housing and other ‘undesirable’ uses” (Paddison, 1983, 
p.208; and see Hamel and Keil, 2015; Keil, 2018), Ronan is paving the way for understanding 
the socio-political geography of the twenty-first century metropolis as an increasingly 
‘splintering’, ‘patchwork’, or ‘fracturing’ landscape (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Florida, 2017; 
Judd and Hinze, 2019). It is one that sees communities confronting intensifying poverty in older 
and under-served suburbs juxtaposed alongside those whose ‘barbed wire mentality’ 
(Paddison, 1983: 213) leaves them insulated from ‘the big city’ by fences and walls, while also 
being in receipt of tailored privately delivered services, all organized by homeowner 
associations, a privatized mode of governmental jurisdiction (McKenzie, 2006; Knox, 2008; 
Peck, 2011; McGirr, 2012).  
 
Amid this discussion Ronan also references St Louis as a city where disparities between 
jurisdictions are ‘more emphatic’. It also registered as the third most fragmented SMSA in the 
recent ‘fragmentation index’ assessment, and in some key respects St Louis remains an 
exemplar of what Ronan illuminated about metropolitan fragmentation. And yet St Louis has 
also been experiencing changes that were more difficult to predict. It came to global public 
attention following the fatal shooting on 9th August, 2014, of Michael Brown, an 18 year-old 
African American man by a white police officer in Ferguson, an independent suburban 
jurisdiction within the SMSA of Lt Louis. This incident was followed by protests, far from unusual 
given the circumstances of police violence mixed with racial prejudice. But what made it 
distinctive was that this unrest flared up in a suburb, not the inner city where one tends to 
associate a mix of police brutality followed by civil disobedience (Dreier and Swanstrom, 2014). 
The thing is that over the last two decades, as the central and inner city of Lt Louis has 
undergone notable gentrification, many poorer communities have been gradually edged out of 
the central and near-inner city – now premium space that is desired, valued, fashionable, and 
crucially, once again profitable (Smith, 1996) – and displaced to outer suburbs and suburban 
cities like Ferguson. Ferguson itself has become a ‘majority Black suburb’21 but one whose 
political leadership and police force are overwhelmingly white (Cowen and Lewis, 2016): a 
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deplorable mismatch in its political and civic representation. But, as Dreier and Swanstrom 
further contend, these suburbs are not poor by accident, explaining how Greater St. Louis now 
stands as one of the most racially and economically segregated areas in the country, following 
a long history of discrimination by developers, banks, landlords, and local governments. They 
go on to contend that present-day Ferguson is “too small and too poor to address the [...] racial 
and economic disparities” (Dreier and Swantsrom, 2014: no pagination): an abject failure of the 
‘small-state’ so beloved of many Americans. Here it is perhaps worth noting that, when drawing 
on a paper from 1967 entitled “Fiscal Imbalance in the American Federal System: Volume 2” 
published by the Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR, 1967), Ronan 
expressed apprehension about the long-term fiscal capacities of small-scale suburban 
jurisdictions (Paddison, 1983, p.208). It is likely he would be continuing to rail against the 
governmental fragmentation that endures in present-day US metropolitan areas and which 
underserves so many poorer people in poorer jurisdictions.  
 
4.  Final thoughts: fragmented state, dismembered state 
 
The conclusion to this tribute is being written at a time when the capacity for national states to 
govern with principled authority and with requisite responsibility for their citizens has been 
placed under the spotlight in a way not witnessed for many a decade, as countries across the 
world endeavour to manage the catastrophic and tragic impacts of Coronavirus, Covid-19. This 
deadly virus is widely assumed to have its origins in the city of Wuhan – with a population of 11 
million and located in Central China’s Hubei province – manifesting in late 2019 before then 
spreading rapidly across many countries during the early months of 2020. At the time of writing 
it is difficult to assess the full implications, which may last years. But it is not to over-estimate 
things to acknowledge that everyday life has altered unrecognisably. While this is clearly not 
the appropriate place to be developing a discussion about what these changes entail, I raise 
this point because national states are involved directly in shaping this new everyday life in 
various ways that would have been unimaginable only months earlier. The intensified monitoring 
by states under Covid-19 is reciprocated by citizens, who on a daily basis evaluate their 
governments in terms of how they are managing the impacts of the virus, notably with regard to 
rates of infection from Covid-19, and deaths recorded as a consequence of Covid-19, and more 
recently the number of tests being carried out in each country22. As the differences between 
countries become more widely circulated, questions are being raised about how and why some 
countries have significantly lower rates than others, and also about whether the territorial form 
of the state and the “diffusion of power between national and sub-national governments” 
(Paddison, 1983, p.ix) are playing key roles in this respect. 
 
In assessing the trends emerging thus far, it seems that China itself was relatively adept in 
containing the spread of the virus beyond Wuhan, while nearby South Korea, a centralized 
unitary state with a population approaching 52 million, is emerging as something of a model. 
Within Europe there have been relatively low death rates in proportion to those for infection 
recorded in Austria and Germany, with significantly high rates in Italy, Spain, the UK, and 
France. Some might point to the particular form of federal decentralisation in Germany, and how 
it appears to enable ‘concerted local intelligence’ to be followed swiftly by local action. It meant 
that health staff in the state of Bavaria were able to track and trace the specific salt shaker 
located in a factory canteen that had contributed to spreading Covid-19 throughout the building, 
thereby permitting the Bavarian regional government to implement policies to contain the virus 
(Hall, 2020). Crucial here, then, might be how Ronan envisaged federalism as “facilitating the 
voice of separate regional interests within an overarching political union [or perhaps too] 
federalism as an exercise in territorial pluralism” (Paddison, 1983, p.100), which has enabled 
Germany among other countries to respond with rapid testing and tracing of those infected. But 
in Germany – and South Korea – it has been the daily rates of testing which have been 
significant alongside the capacity to contact and trace those with the virus: and there is no easy 
way to say this, but in the relatively good times – let alone a situation of global emergency – 
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local “services need to be paid for... and [here] we need to consider the fiscal implications of 
service provision in the fragmented state” (Paddison, 1983, p. ix).  
 
Germany can be contrasted with another high-profile state organized on federal political terms. 
At the time of writing, the US has the highest rate of deaths and infections,23 and news of this 
scenario is heightened by President Trump’s own visibility. Yet throughout February and deep 
into March he appeared reluctant to acknowledge the virus as a problem for the US, taking ‘no 
responsibility’ for fighting it, leaving state governors and local administrations to prepare. But 
then, on realising the precarious condition of the US economy and that he might be deemed its 
saviour, he suddenly claimed ‘total authority’: in effect to “supersede decisions made by the 
states and suggesting that governors who wanted to lift lockdowns at their own pace rather than 
his direction were committing ‘mutiny’” (Gawthorpe, 2020, p.X). Such bluster certainly sits 
uncomfortably with the claim that “federalism is a constitutional expression of the amalgamation 
of political territories into a larger unit without coercion” (Paddison, 1983, p.ix). But the President 
has routinely been under scrutiny from Governors across the US, with the impressively articulate 
and compassionate Democrat governor of New York State, Andrew Cuomo, politely requesting 
that the President listen to the concerns of citizens while offering federal assistance. New York 
City’s Democrat Mayor Bill de Blasio has also campaigned for increased federal funding for US 
cities, criticising the $1.4 billion stimulus package that New York City had received given how 
the US airline industry had been awarded £58 billion (Helmore, 2020). Gawthorpe (2020) 
contends that in principle federalism offers “a logical way for the United States to respond to 
epidemics”, with states having primary responsibility for the health of their citizens, about whom 
they have the best information. But for federalism to respond effectively the federal government 
and President ought to offer some leadership in coordinating a national response, and not resort 
to deviously offloading responsibility and blame while routinely name-calling any state 
governors or city mayors who voice concerns about the health and safety of their citizens. 
Gawthorpe ventures further to contend that indeed federalism can be added to the ever-growing 
list of American institutions at the core of the Constitution which Trump has callously 
disregarded. 
 
Finally, I turn to the UK, where Ronan lived, although we know that he lived and worked for most 
of his life Glasgow, Scotland. The UK state offers a pivotal focus for TFS, with issues of central-
local relations remaining at its core. It is fascinating to consider what exactly Ronan would be 
making of the current situation in Britain. It certainly comes across in many pages how Ronan 
believed in the scope for local governments to make a difference to the lives of citizens, while 
also encouraging a relational perspective that eschews a culturally-diminishing localism and the 
‘localist trap’.24 The Covid-19 crisis in the UK has certainly placed local government in the thick 
of the response. Indeed, many are recognising anew the role played by on-the-ground officials 
and employees; and, increasingly via community hubs, local authority employees are providing 
food and shelter to people at risk while assisting local businesses to stay afloat (Hall, 2020; 
Toynbee, 2020). But Councils are also exasperated: officials, employees and politicians. Having 
for years been on the sharp end of austerity vis-à-vis savage cuts to funding, they are now 
expected to deliver without financial support, echoing the case of the US. More than this, though, 
their local knowledge – and their ‘publicness’ in terms of funding and accountability – are being 
overlooked by a Conservative-run central state that has chosen to centralise and outsource the 
process of Covid-19 testing (Hall, 2020): effectively carrying over the habits betrayed by 
Thatcherism back in the 1980s, when the social care of elderly people was forcibly subjected to 
the vagaries of the market: a long-term catastrophe the effect of which is leaving employees 
and patients in this sector lacking the infrastructure to address the spread of the virus.  
 
In looking to take all this into consideration, in the case of the UK The Fragmented State that 
Ronan analysed is on balance probably increasingly fragmented at each spatial level: with the 
longer-term implications of the 1990s devolution package plus a decade of austerity and the 
territorial fall-out of Brexit weighing heavily on any remaining ‘compound unitary’ status and a 
beleaguered local government committed to delivering services facing scarce funding and beset 
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by a ‘parsimonious devolution of power’ (Paddison, 1983, p.142). Some of these consequences 
are encapsulated incisively in Toynbee and Walker’s (2017) analysis of the UK as a 
‘dismembered state’: one increasingly shorn of social and physical protections for citizens, and 
which – in the wake of outsourcing, deregulation, privatization – has been so ‘confusingly 
branded’ as to instil bewilderment over which organization in which locality might be responsible 
for what service (also Meek, 2015). Nonetheless, immersing oneself in Ronan’s defining 
contribution, The Fragmented State, will go some way towards better understanding the 
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1 In actual fact, eleven months had elapsed since Ronan and colleagues had provided their insightful 
comments.  
 
2 Renamed Political Geography in 1992. 
 
3 In making this argument, Ronan is also citing approvingly some of the pioneering work on the 
capitalist state that had been only recently been developed by geographers like Gordon Clark and 
Michael Dear (also Clark and Dear, 1984).  
 
4 Perhaps add an endnote to the effect that Ronan recognised there to be other state forms - other than 
the 'modern industrial state' of his quote - where 'redistributive justice' would not be a remotely 
entertained input/motivation for state activity? Arguably too, such a motivation is one to which certain 
modern states only ever pay 'lip service', it not being the real heart of the commitments of the state 
elite? 
 
5 Ronan never lost sight of the importance of the politics of service provision: indeed arguably it was 
precisely this focus on the relationship between endeavours by the Glasgow local state to ‘manage’ 
expectations of distributive justice while also de-amplifying protest about this very management 
alongside the erosion of the public spaces of Glasgow that has enabled his paper on the ‘post-political 
city’ to remain one of the standout papers thus far in the debate (Paddison, 2009; Karaliotas, 2020). 
 
6 The initial prompting of this was the Changing Urban and Regional System initiative funded by the UK 
Economic and Social Research Council which ran from 1984-88. While the research provided some 
significant findings (e.g. Cooke, 1989), these became enveloped by an often acrimonious set of 
discussions over methodology and theory (see Duncan, 1989), while also offering some foresight into 
how postmodernism became entangled with debates in urban studies (Harvey, 1987; Cooke, 1987). 
Re-reading the early stages of TFS prompts me to contemplate how so well-placed Ronan was to offer 
something constructive to this debate.  
 
7 Some of Germany’s sixteen regional-level governments assert the title Länder (meaning literally land 
countries). Amid much talk in the 1990s of a Europe of the Regions, a notable debate surfaced about 
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the extent to which these Federal arrangements served well in shaping powerful regional-state level 
economies (Harvie, 1994).  
 
8 While at various stages in TFS, Ronan signals the growing urbanization of the population, in the 
period since, this has escalated considerably. 
  
9 In these pages, Ronan offers an adroit synthesis of key works by Williams and Adrian (1963), Stanyer 
(1976), Cockburn (1977), (Castells (1977), and Saunders( 1979). 
 
10 In contrast to the Block grant, these are tied to particular spending programmes and coming with 
conditions determined by central government (Paddison, 1983: 168).  
 
11 Ronan qualifies this a little by signaling that rates of urbanization in the ‘developing’ countries is 
happening at a faster rate than in the industrial ‘developed’ ones, where ‘counter-urbanization’ has also 
been a key trend. But the overall argument is accurate and much of what proceeds in the chapter 
appreciates the complexity of such ‘counter-urban’ arguments, not least in that many such spaces have 
since the 1980s been overwhelmed by various forms of urbanization, suburbanization, and post-
suburbanization (Keil, 2018). 
 
12 A classic case is offered in the ‘redlining’ of certain neighbourhoods in US cities during much of the 
period of ‘urban renewal’, a process that saw banks and lending institutions reluctant to offer mortgage 
loans often on the grounds of race (Smith, 1996). 
 
13 See Iveson (2014) for a recent retrospective on this. 
 
14 One might surmise that Ronan’s interest in this insurgent movement surfaced during a sabbatical in 
1976-77 at the University of New England, Armidale, in New South Wales, where he became involved 
in establishing a new Planning Course (Philo, 2020) 
 
15 The US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines a SMSA as one or more adjecent counties 
or county equivalents that have at least one urban core of 50,000 population. The figure of 392 also 





17 Given Ronan’s masterful excursion into some key instances of post-politicising in Glasgow 
(Paddison, 2009; Karaliotas, 2020), it is easy to envisage him being avidly interested in examining how 
special districts raise the spectre of a de-politicisation of metropolitan areas.  
 
18 This is measured relatively taking into consideration population and land area (Hendrick and Shi, 
2015). 
 
19 At certain stages in chapters 5 and 6 of TFS, there are signs that Ronan might have been searching 
to develop a critical political geography of urban justice, especially with regard to ensuring citizens a fair 
distribution of services and welfare. To be sure by the time of its publication, Marxian analysis had 
already been having a profound influence, and David Harvey’s (1973) Social Justice and the City 
appears, as does the more reformist ‘welfare geography’ of David Smith (1977). But there is also a 
sense that Ronan might have been aiming to articulate something akin to that of the spatiality of justice 
which Ed Soja (Soja, 2010) arrived at sometime later in his ever tenacious endeavours to uncover the 
geography of Los Angeles, itself often depicted to be the most iconic ‘fragmented metropolis’ of recent 
decades. Mark Boyle has offered some helpful prompts on these reflections.  
 
20 There are resonances here with Beauregard’s (2006) more recent thesis detailing how suburban 
jurisdictions impose a form of ‘parasitic urbanization’ in relation to central cities. 
 
21 From a population that was 85% white in 1980, Ferguson had become 69% Black by 2010 
(Goldstein, 2014). And more generally, as Rothstein (2014) identifies, “Whereas 20th century 
segregation took the form of Black central cities surrounded by white suburbs, 21st century segregation 
is in transition—to whiter central cities with adjoining Black suburbs.” 
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22 It is not anticipated that a vaccine which could be applied on a mass basis across the world will be 
available much before the latter stages of 2020, this being on the optimistic side.  
 
23 The highest in aggregate but the seventh highest per 100,000 population, although date for this is 
fast-moving and contested. 
 
24 Ronan offered some discussion about the uncritical decentralization of authority to local power bases 
and the limits to democracy of a localism (Paddison, 1983, pp.52-53), to some extent presaging the 
idea of what Purcell (2006) terms ‘localist trap’: the uncritical assumption that because it is ‘closest to 
the people’, the local represents the most significant governmental level for enhancing democracy. 
 
 
